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ON HENRY CORBIN’S
THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE

What is the *Theology of Aristotle*? The Arabic *Theology of Aristotle* (Úthulūjiyā Aristū) and other collections (dubbed the *Plotiniana Arabica*) contain extracts from Plotinus’s works, originally collected and systematized by Porphyry into six groups of “nines” or “Enneads” (see Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus*), and were translated into Arabic by Syriac Christians, part of the Muslim al-Kindī circle (d. 260/873), in the ninth century. The *Theology* played an integral role in the philosophical thought of Muslim and Jewish thinkers such as al-Kindī, al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), Ibn Sīnā [Avicenna] (d. 429/1037), the Brethren of Purity (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafā*, c. ninth-tenth century), Isaac Israeli (d. 320/932), Natan’el al-Fayyūmī (d. 1165), Ibn Gabirol (d. 1050 or 1070), and Ibn Ezra (d. 1167). How and why this *Plotiniana Arabica* work was wrongly attributed to Aristotle remains unknown, for these collections clearly contain paraphrases of *Enneads IV-VI* (which have been given a partial English translation by G. Lewis in *Plotini Opera*, vol. 2, ed. Paul Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, 1959). They include the following: (1) The so-called *Theology of Aristotle* itself, in long and short, or vulgate, recensions (whose interconnection is unclear), which comprises a prologue followed by 142 topics that are then addressed in longer passages, each titled “chapters” (*mayāmīr*) in Syriac. They are paraphrased interpretations of *Enneads IV-VI*, perhaps belonging to Porphyry’s lost commentaries or summaries, which are to be traced either to a Syriac original or to the Christian translator of Plotinus into Arabic from Syriac known as al-Himṣī or to al-Kindī himself. (2) There is also another work, titled *The Letter of Divine Science*, which contains a paraphrase of V.3-5 and V.9, attributed wrongly

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2. Numbers in parentheses signify the Islamic (AH) and Gregorian (AD) dates.
to Al Farabî.\(^6\) Finally, there are various materials attributed to the “the Greek Sage” (al-Shaykh al-Yûnâni), paraphrases of Enneads IV-VI and, thus, parallel to the Theology.\(^7\)

It has been argued that the Arabic tradition perhaps retained traces of Plotinus’s oral teaching preserved by Amelius (Plotinus’s colleague at Rome in the third century CE), that is, an alternative textual transmission to that of Porphyry’s edition with its characteristic Enneadic structure: “... Le Livre de la Théologie ... n’est qu’un fragment des notes de cours d’Amélius.”\(^8\) However, the Enneadic edition of Porphyry is, in fact, the one presupposed by the Theology of Aristotle that actually cites Porphyry in the title of the first chapter and that bears traces of the κεφάλαια, ὑπομνήματα, and ἐπιχειρήματα that Porphyry had added to his own edition (Life of Plotinus, 26, 28-40, confirmed by Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, 45, 4-9 Colonna).\(^9\) So in the ninth century, in Baghdad, it was possible to read a complete manuscript of the Enneads, and either al-Hîmî (if there was a Syriac translation of the Enneads before an Arabic version) or al-Kindî or both had the entire Enneads before their eyes. The Theology of Aristotle and related works, then, go back, through the work of al-Kindî and Syriac Christians, to Porphyry’s edition of Plotinus’s Enneads IV-VI. We still await a proper edition of the Theology, an edition that is currently under preparation by a team directed by Cristina D’Ancona.\(^10\)

What is the importance of the Theology for Henry Corbin (1903-1978) in this talk written two years before his death? It is first important to note that Corbin had a very thorough knowledge of the Theology. He dedicates six pages of the first chapter of his History of Islamic Philosophy to the Greek texts that were translated into Arabic and writes that the Theology could have been based on “a Syriac version dating from the sixth century, an epoch during which Neoplatonism flourished both among the Nestorians and at the Sasanid court. (To this epoch, too, belongs the body of writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite.)”\(^11\) Furthermore, he notes that Ibn Sînâ had suspected that this is not a work by Aristotle\(^12\) and that “Suhrawardî ascribes the ‘ecstatic confession’ of the Enneads to Plato himself.”\(^13\) Finally, both Mîr Dâmâm (d. 1041-42/1631-32) and Saʿîd Qummî (d. 1103/1691) also wrote commentaries on the Theology.\(^14\)

The implications of these commentaries are far-reaching. The Theology communicates the heritage of antiquity in the thoroughly confusing and ambiguous form of Platonism under the name of Aristotle and complicates the Peripatetic transmission of Aristotle, apparently presenting a “Platonic Aristotle” and preventing any unreserved

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\(^6\) Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 7.

\(^7\) Ibid.


\(^10\) For information on progress, see http://www.greekintoirabic.eu.


\(^12\) Ibid., 18; D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 145.

\(^13\) Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 18.

\(^14\) Ibid.
demarcation lines between Platonic and Aristotelian thought. It thus transmits Greek learning in a way that will often be questioned in the subsequent tradition. But its influence is far-reaching, for it does not stop in the Middle Ages, with Islamic, Jewish, and Christian adaptations of this heritage, as is commonly thought even today. It moves through Suhrawardi’s (d. 587/1191) ontological cosmology of light. Suhrawardi’s school of Illuminationism (Ishrāq) was based on four primary sources: Sufi works as based on the works of al-Ghazālī (d. 504/1111) and Maḥṣūr al-Hallāj (d. 310/922); Muslim Peripatetic philosophy (al-Maṣḥūṣ, iyyūn); Hermeticism, Pythagoreanism, and Platonism as transmitted by the Sabians of Ḥarrān and the Theology; and, finally, the religious and philosophical thought of the Zoroastrians,15 which was transmitted through Ferdowsī’s Epic Book of Kings (Shahnameh).16 Suhrwardi once asked Plotinus in a dream if the real philosophers were al-Fārābī or Ibn Sīnā or both.17 Plotinus responded, “Not a degree in a thousand. Rather, the Sufis Bayāzīd Baṣṭāmī [d. 261/874] and Tustaṭ [d. 283/896] are the real philosophers.”18 For Suhrwardi, Plotinus’s response to his question was not surprising in the slightest. Although he began with Peripatetic premises, Suhrwardi’s philosophical thought was radically different from that of his predecessors. Not only did he break away from Aristotelian hylomorphism, instead seeing everything outside of God (as the Light above lights [Nīr al-anwār]) as a composite of light and darkness, but he also saw the journey back to pure light as a road paved by the Sufis. Furthermore, Plotinus’s declaration of Plato’s superiority over all other philosophers and his vigorous defense of him confirmed his conversion from affiliation to his Muslim predecessors to the theoretical thought of the ancient Persians and Greeks. Finally, the author’s declaration of the ecstatic Sufis as the true inheritors of Platonic thought cemented his belief in the practice of the Sufis. In the famous instance noted by Corbin, Suhrwardi cites the famous ecstatic passage from Plotinus, Ennead IV.8 [6] 1, 1-11 (“Often have I woken up to myself out of the body and entered into myself... seeing a beauty of great wonder and trusting that then above all I belonged to the greater part”). This passage is paraphrased prominently in the Theology of Aristotle,19 and Suhrwardi puts the accent on its Platonic heritage – or, as Corbin characterizes this, “a sort of Platonic and Zoroastrian Neoplatonist thought” for the Islamic-Iranian world.

Later still, this heritage is of major importance for Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631-32), the foremost figure (together with his student Mullā Ṣadrā [d. 1050/1640]) of the intellectual and cultural rebirth of Iran under the Safavid dynasty, the founder of the School of Isfahan, the Third Teacher (al-muʿāllim al-thālith) after Aristotle and al-Fārābī. He was known as the “Master of the Learned” (Sayyid al-afāḍī), becoming an integral part of Islamic philosophy, and, as Corbin rightly notes, his thought is still alive in Iran today.20

15 Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 60-61.
18 Ibid.
19 For translation, see Lewis in Henry and Schwyzer, Plotini Opera II, 225, lines 1-26.
20 For an examination of the state of Islamic philosophy today, see S. Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from Its Origins to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 235-73. It is important to note that various figures, living both in and out of Iran, currently represent these philosophical strands. For example, Gholamreza Aavani (b. 1943), who is known as the “Wayfarer of Wisdom” (Sālik-e-Hikmat), is
Mir Dāmād’s pen name was Ishrāq, another reference to Suhrawardi’s Illuminationist philosophy and to his substantial adherence to Platonic and Neoplatonic thought. What is an ecstatic confession in Suhrawardi is, in Corbin’s view, colored by a profound sadness in Mir Dāmād – something that shows the diversity of reception. Here it is not clear to us exactly what Corbin had in mind.

In the final part of his talk, Corbin picks out several influences from the Theology that lead to several claims that will seem extraordinary if not absurd to most modern readers. First, there is the claim that there is an interworld (‘alām al-mithāl/khayal or mundus imaginalis) of the imagination between the sensible and the intelligible worlds in the thought of Ibn ‘Arabī. In his Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth, Corbin summarizes his views on this inter-earth as “the land of nowhere” (na-koja-abād) or “the eighth climate.”21 This is the land where dreams and miracles exist, where images exist in their actual reality, and the place of the celestial mountain Qaf.22 Second, the claim that in the inter-world there is an intimate theophany represented by the biblical and Qur’ānic paradox that no one will see the face of God and live (Exodus 33:20; Qurʾān 55:26), on the one hand, and yet that the prophet sees his god in the most beautiful form (according to the famous hadīth al-ruʿyā) – a paradox that, in Corbin’s view, entails that the death of the human being makes him responsible for the death of his god in that theophany and that human prayer and divine prayer are two sides of a single coin.

What does Corbin mean, and to which texts in the Theology does he refer? Unfortunately, he gives no references (besides Enneed IV.8.1), but perhaps we could point

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21 Corbin, Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth, 85.
22 Ibid.
to such texts as Ennead IV.3.18 (not reproduced in Lewis’s translation), where Plotinus observes cryptically that, although the souls “there” do not use discursive reasoning and speech, they “would know by understanding what passes from one another ... for ... there all their body is pure, and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or feigned, but before one speaks to another that other has seen and understood” (18, 18-22). And there are other passages, such as the apparently intermediate “true heaven, the true light, and the true earth” in the myth at the end of Plato’s Phaedo (109e-110a), that made an impression upon Plotinus in Ennead V.8.4 and also upon Sethian Gnostics in Zostrianos (Zost. 47.27-48.29; cf. also 55.13-25).24

However, the central difference between modern usage and Ibn ‘Arabī is that, while we tend to make imagination and its images into unreal fantasies, an image for Ibn ‘Arabī and Corbin is not to be reduced to external things or simply to nothing but rather uploaded, as it were, into its broader significance – not on the discursive level but as a manifestation of the divine imagination or theophanic compassion, which wants to reveal itself to us as an individual theopathy in our experience. In other words, the creative imagination is not a modern tag for some nebulous faculty but a real experience of the divine yearning in us that stands between sense experience and understanding. This noetic value of the imagination means that there is “more” in our images than we can unpack and this “more” has to be lived on its own terms as part of the divine yearning to reveal Itself to each of us in our experience, however differently, indeed uniquely, it is experienced in each individual. Corbin often quotes the famous hadith: “I was a hidden Treasure, I yearned [loved] to be known. That is why I produced creatures, in order to be known in them” (see, for example, Alone with the Alone, 184).

If this seems completely outside the range of modern consciousness, Corbin’s second claim will seem just as, if not even more, absurd – namely, his claim about the death of God and the bi-unity (a term Corbin uses in his other works) of divine-human prayer. We take Corbin’s claim about the death of God in the light of Ibn ‘Arabī’s views: first, that in death we wake up into ourselves and into God; and, second, that since, in the creative imagination, God’s theophanic imagination entrusts Itself into our care, we have a responsibility for the Divine Being so entrusted in Its vulnerability, a responsibility not to annihilate or reject God. It is in this sense, we think, that Corbin intends the listener/reader to understand the citation from the mystic Angelus Silesius (1624-1677), as he also does in Alone with the Alone, where he cites Silesius to emphasize the radical mystical interrelation between God and man – an interdependence, in fact, that is also reflected, according to Corbin, in Ibn ‘Arabī’s practice of prayer. Here, for Ibn ‘Arabī, the mystic prototype of prayer consists in Abraham “offering the mystic repast to the Angels under the oak of Mamre,” where the faithful one has “a divine service which consists in feeding his lord of love on his own being and on all creation.”25 Ibn ‘Arabī describes prayer as “theophanic,” “a dialogue between two beings,” “a means of existing and of causing to exist,” and “the process of creative creation.”26 For Ibn ‘Arabī, as for Corbin, prayer

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24 For the broader Platonic antecedents of this Zostrianian conception, see Phaedo 109a9-112a4, Phaedrus 247 ff.
26 Ibid., 267.
is an active and continuous exchange between God and the human being, where the act of creation occurs in the process of conversation. Prayer, therefore, is less a request for something than “it is the expression of a mode of being, a means of existing and of causing to exist, that is, a means of causing the God who reveals Himself to appear, of ‘seeing’ Him, not to be sure in His essence, but in the form which precisely He reveals by revealing Himself by and to that form.” Corbin puts this in slightly different terms here, but the sense is similar: “Man is a fighting partner of his god who fights with him for whom he fights, and each has need of the other’s service. This is the magnificent sense of prayer – a prayer of god and a prayer of man.”

If we think of all this in terms of common binaries in philosophical-theological language (uncreated-created, Creator-creature, hypostatic union of two natures, etc.), then it will certainly seem absurd. In Corbin’s view, we cannot reduce the creative theophanic-theopathic imagination to such schemas, for the pathos of Divine Love in our love is more immediate, more intimate, and more personal than such structures can ever allow.

What does any of this have to do with Aristotle – or even with Plotinus? On the surface, not much. In fact, Corbin’s talk will seem alien to most readers of Aristotle in the contemporary world. In his closing paragraphs, Corbin himself is fully aware of this. On the one hand, how can we separate Plotinus from his subsequent Neoplatonic “destiny,” he asks? On the other hand, Suhrawardi himself seems so close to Proclus but we cannot easily demonstrate a link. Yet again, we cannot forget, Corbin insists, how Proclus “restores” theogony and a Hellenistic religious sensibility to Plotinus or how Plotinus goes right to the heart of Abrahamic thought. In Corbin’s own time, this penetration of “Plotinus” into Jewish, Islamic, or Christian thought seemed “like a dream” and, despite all the scholarship since his death 40 years ago, it still seems difficult. Nonetheless, if Porphyry is correct in his view that “Aristotle’s Metaphysics is concentrated” in Plotinus’s writings (Life of Plotinus, chap. 14), then until Porphyry’s seminal insight from over 1700 years ago is understood more fully, the connection between Aristotle, Plotinus, and the subsequent remarkable history of “Neoplatonic” thought, across the range of the Abrahamic religions, will continue to remain, unfortunately, “like a dream.”

27 Ibid., 248.
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Kevin Corrigan and Syed A. H. Zaidi

ON HENRY CORBIN’S THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE

This commentary focuses on Corbin’s understanding of the Theology of Aristotle and shows how it was used in the works of major Muslim philosophers. In his short piece, Corbin argues on the basis of the Theology that there is an inter-earth known as the “the land of nowhere,” (na-ka-ja-abād), “the eighth climate,” or the mundus imaginalis, where dreams and miracles exist, where the Qur’anic celestial mountain Qāf is situated, and where prayers become reality. This article shows how the “eighth climate” is a world found in the ontological and cosmological religious philosophies of Plotinus and Proclus and outlines the important role it plays in the Theology. It then goes on to show how Ibn ‘Arabi, Suhrawardī, and Mīr Dāmād employed the mundus imaginalis in their cosmological doctrines. For Corbin the mundus imaginalis was an important cornerstone in Greek philosophy that influenced all of medieval Abrahamic thought, a cornerstone now lost in an age of analytic philosophy.

Thomas Alexander Szlezák

ON KARL KERÉNYI’S HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIALISTIC PLATIONISM

This article tries to give a critical comment on the short essay by Karl Kerényi on Plato from 1940. Kerényi proves to be, on the one hand, a typical representative of the European intellectual world of the first half of the twentieth century, insofar as he does not realize fully the meaning of Plato’s criticism of writing at the end of the Phaedrus. On the other hand, he saw important things that tend to be overlooked in our days. He treats the Seventh Letter rightly as authentic and does not believe, as even today many Platonists do, that αὐτοψία means “treatise”: Plato is not criticizing a specific literary form of writing but writing as such. Most valuable is Kerényi’s interpretation of Plato’s metaphysical approach. Plato’s goal is not to recommend a new religion. He points to something that lies at the roots of religion, philosophy, art, and all spiritual longing. Therefore, Plato’s Ideas of Truth, Beauty, and the Good are in the first place contents of personal existentialist experience, apt to transform your individual life.

Diego De Brasi

KARÓLY KERÉNYI AND THE PLATONIC DIALOGUE

In this paper, I comment on Károly Kerényi’s essay Platonism. First, I briefly examine the aspects of Platonism and of Plato’s literary style that Kerényi highlights in these essays. Second, I focus on some methodological aspects of his reading of Plato and examine them within the broader context of his dissociation from traditional philology. In particular, I analyze some of the programmatic claims made in his prefaxes to the first two editions of Apollon and in his Bericht über die Arbeiten der Jahre 1939-1948. Then I consider some critical remarks that clearly set both essays at odds with the interpretation of Plato that was dominant in Germany at that time. Further I show the continuities between Unsterblichkeit und Apollonreligion and Platonism. Finally, I critically assess Kerényi’s reading of Plato from the perspective of the contemporary scholarly debate on Plato.

Piotr Nowak

I DIE, THEREFORE I AM: PHAEDO AS A POLITICAL DIALOGUE

Phaedo is not a dialogue on death or dying. Neither is it an opinion on immortality in a narrow sense – that is, whether there is life after death or not, whether it hurts to live in Tartarus or not. Rather, Phaedo’s content is, according to Gadamer, “not immortality at all but rather that which constitutes the actual being of the soul – not in regard to its possible mortality or immortality but to its ever vigilant understanding of itself and reality.”
I would like to recommend the Phaedo as the second greatest, right after The Republic, political treaty of antiquity. It is my strong conviction that its lesson has been written as if in between the parts of the philosopher’s soul – the philosopher who is willing to serve the state with his wisdom. I think the best way to reconstruct Phaedo’s political drama is to employ the structure of the cave parable borrowed from Book Seven of Plato’s Republic.

John Sallis

SOCRATES’S SECOND SAILING: THE TURN TO LOGOS

This essay focuses on the passage in Plato’s Phaedo in which Socrates recounts his philosophical development, from the period in which he took up investigations of nature, to that in which he was attracted by – but ultimately disappointed in – the theories of Anaxagoras, to the period in which he finally carried out the turn that proved decisive. This truly Socratic turn he describes as his second sailing, adopting the phrase that was used to describe the practice of taking up the oars when there was no wind to fill the sails. Having failed in his efforts to investigate things directly, he launches the indirect approach, which consists in turning to λόγος. In this way he goes about his search for the truth of things. The task of the present essay is to interpret the precise sense of this turn to λόγος and the way in which it opens the way to a discovery of the truth of things. In this interpretation it is shown that it is the manifold nature of λόγος itself that enables Socrates’s philosophical endeavor.

Eva Brann

COURAGE NAILED DOWN: PLATO’S LACHES

Socrates’s philosophizing is a sort of unperturbed unsettledness, hence “ironic” in the specific sense of “paradoxical.” From this perspective, the Laches, Socrates’s conversation with two generals, gives the answer to the question “What is courage?” in terms applicable to all the canonical virtues, such as justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom. In this understanding, courage is descriptively distinct from and essentially identical to all the virtues. For courage looks like and can be particularly described as endurance, but it is, in its being, wisdom. This wisdom is, however, distinct from that in the canonical list, where it is a sort of know-how, an expertise. This hyper-wisdom is instead one that welds all the particular virtues into a super-virtue, one that is concerned with ends, with finalities. Consequently, in the Laches, as in other dialogues, Socrates’s refutational logicizing gives way, as a mere preliminary cleansing of the mind, to a mode of clear-eyed self-contradiction that conveys the truth about courage. Although the Laches does not explicitly answer the generals’ practical question, how to make their sons courageous, the dialogue implies Socrates’s recommendation: Think out the question “What is courage?” and the cognitive effort will have an ethical result. For Socrates is convinced that to gain wisdom about courage is to become courageous. He himself embodies this genuine courage which is wisdom.

Burt C. Hopkins

DIVIDING MADNESS AND THE APPEARANCES OF EROS IN THE PHAEDRUS

The criteria behind the dialogue’s criticism of writing and the argument for the superiority of spoken over written λόγος is applied to Lysias’s and Socrates’s speeches on Eros and madness and Phaedrus’s and Socrates’s critical examination of these speeches. The argument is made that the dialogue’s dramatic portrayal of both these speeches and their examination present written word images that conjure up in the soul of the reader Socrates’s and Phaedrus’s original spoken λόγος. It follows from this that the criteria for assessing their λόγος should be what that λόγος presents with regard to distinguishing good and bad speech, not good and bad writing (which are not investigated in the dialogue). In line with this, the inconsistencies between the divisions of madness and the appearances of Eros in the speeches and their examination in the dialogue point not to a deficiency in Plato’s writing but to the original investigation of the community of madness and Eros in Socrates’s and Phaedrus’s spoken λόγος. Interpreted thusly, the community in question is established not by argument but by its appearance in the λόγος of the Lover Socrates and his Beloved Phaedrus. This appearance is one in which the reader may share, insofar as the dialogue’s written word images serve as reminders to the reader of the knowledge they already possess of Eros’s community with madness and its source in the beauty of the face and body parts of their Beloved.

Peter Kalkavage

POETIC SCIENCE IN PLATO’S TIMAEUS

In Plato’s Timaeus, Socrates foregoes his usual questioning and receives an elaborate speech about world order from the scientist-statesman, Timaeus. The “likely story,” as Timaeus calls it, is not just a speech about the cosmos but an imitation of the very deed by which the cosmos came to be. This mimetic act celebrates two things: the cosmos as a divinely ordered whole and the productive art or τέχνη that went into the making of the whole. The cosmology of Timaeus may therefore be called “poetic science,” since it
is not the order as such but the making of order, most beautifully displayed in the mathematical tuning of the scale (for the cosmic soul) and the construction of the regular solids (for the cosmic body), that gives us cognitive access to what the cosmos essentially is or, rather, what it is imagined to be – a thing well made.

But cognition for its own sake is not the goal of poetic science. Timaeus’s account connects mathematics and poetic science with the ethical good and practical wisdom. To give likely accounts of the whole is to establish a healthy, because intelligent, bond with the laws of the cosmic regime and to bring our souls into virtuous conformity with that regime. By playfully sharing in the technical modes of divine making, especially when this concerns our ingeniously devised bodily structures, we come to know, in detail, the complexity of our being in light of the whole of becoming. The τέχνη-driven account of the human good in the Timaeus in this way invites contrast with the dialectical pursuit of the good in The Republic.

Richard Bodéüs
THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND ITS OBJECT ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE

In the first section, I consider (1) Aristotle’s use of the adjective “theological,” then (2) some potential presuppositions aiming at an explication of this adjective, and, finally, (3) a project of Platonic origins, which seems to be the main concern of Aristotle’s use of this adjective.

In the second section, (4) I attempt to explain how one could find certain elements of “theological” science in Aristotle, and (5) how one could possibly recollect these elements.

In the third section, I take into account (6) the silence that is, on principle, imposed on the second philosophy regarding the noetical soul, and, further, (7) the rigorous distinction that Aristotle poses between the living body and the celestial body, and, finally, (8), the causal union he establishes between the celestial body and the noetical soul, thus sketching a profile of god that differs from human in a twofold manner.

In the fourth section, I explain (9) why the divine body and the divine soul, although separated, remain united in a suitable way, and, further, (10) why the divine good is not separable from the multiplicity of the gods.

In the fifth and last section, I conclude with (11) an attempt to collect the key data that allow for a reconstruction of the profile of the heavenly gods, thus evaluating its significance from the viewpoint of a potential “theological” science. Finally, (12) I compare it with a certain belief that seems independent from it and that is held by the Philosopher, who does not hesitate to assert it.

Mark Shiffman
HOW THE PRIOR BY NATURE COMES TO LIGHT IN CATEGORIES 12

In chapter 12 of the Categories, Aristotle initially promises the reader to distinguish four different senses of priority but then reconsiders and adds a fifth, the prior by nature. We might interpret this as a later revision of an original text. This would accord with a modern chronological interpretation like that of Christopher Long, which sees in the Categories a preliminary doctrine of ōúría whose instability requires that Aristotle develop his more mature doctrines of material/formal relations and the priority of ἐνοτήτα over ὑπομονή. Alternatively, with the ancient commentators, we might read the Categories as intentionally propaedeutic to metaphysics and the passage in question as composed with a pedagogical intention. Drawing on Heidegger’s phenomenological account of the emergence to view of the prior by nature, this article argues that chapter 12 marks a shift in horizon – from a pre-metaphysical account of ōúría, governed by priority in time, to a metaphysical horizon concerned with causal relations among beings – and that this shift of horizon governs how Aristotle, beginning in chapter 13, revisits topics addressed earlier in the text. Thus the pedagogical reading of ancient commentators is not displaced but rather enhanced by recognizing the instability of the doctrine of ōúria, on the assumption (supported by this analysis of the text) that Aristotle himself recognizes that instability as one inherent in the natural path of philosophical learning and incorporated it into his unfolding of the text. At the same time, a phenomenological reading of how Aristotle’s fourth sense of priority opens the way to this unexpected fifth sense challenges the adequacy of Heidegger’s narrative, according to which Plato’s doctrine of the priority of the idea of the Good is destined to eventuate in Nietzsche’s metaphysical doctrine of will-to-power.

Joshua Kerr
PHYTOLOGY: BETWEEN PHΟΣΙΣ AND ZOE

What is the place of the vegetal in Aristotle’s account of living things? In contrast to his predecessors, Aristotle begins with the life of plants, insisting upon a vegetal beginning to the inquiry concerning soul. At the same time, vegetal life quickly recedes and vanishes in his account, which remains oriented around the animal. Life in plants thus appears as the origin for a zoological account of life while nevertheless remaining foreign to that account. Although this has led many interpreters to see vegetality as merely a primitive stage of animality, I understand Aristotle’s ambivalence concerning plants as the mark of a certain autonomy of plant life vis-à-vis animal life. This is expressed poignantly in his vacillations concerning local motion and desire, which he both affirms and denies of plants. Although related to animals (ζῷον) as a form of life (ζωή), the plant (φυτόν) remains more closely related with nature (φύσις) as the
coming to be and passing away of things. In this way, the plant manifests a germinal form of life that in its hiddenness simultaneously discloses φύσις as a principle of animal life.

Françoise Dastur

**SOME REMARKS ON HEIDEGGER’S READING OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS: MATTER, FORM, AND PRODUCTION**

For Heidegger in 1927, the question was to discover the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology, a task that led him to the analysis of Aristotle’s *Physics*, which he considered as the “foundational book of Western Philosophy.” In his 1939-1940 seminar dedicated to Aristotle’s conception of φύσις, he undertakes to show that the Aristotelian interpretation of φύσις guides all succeeding interpretation of the being of nature, since he places the question of φύσις on an entirely new level. This new level is the level of production, that is, of the productive behavior of the human being, which implies the application of a form, μορφή, to a preexisting matter, ὕλη. But Aristotle nevertheless succeeds in showing that there is another mode of production than making, that is, growing, which involves the fundamental negative category of στέρησις, privation, which alone allows the understanding of the process of blossoming and fructification. It is therefore on the basis of στέρησις that the essential mobility of φύσις has to be understood, whereas for us modern beings, nature is unilaterally understood on the basis of production, as is shown by the fact that Kant could see in nature a “technique.” It is only if we place ourselves in the artistic attitude that we succeed in understanding that what is set forth in the Open through the work of art is the self-secluding process of nature, which, as Heraclitus said, κρύπτοσθαι φιλο, since the emerging and rising of all things tends from itself to keep itself secluded.

Francisco J. Gonzalez

**GROUNDING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION EXISTENTIALLY: HEIDEGGER ON ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS GAMMA IN AN UNPUBLISHED SEMINAR FROM 1928/29**

In the winter semester of 1928-1929, Martin Heidegger delivered a seminar titled *The Ontological Principles and the Problem of Categories*. This seminar remains unpublished in any form and has not received any discussion or even acknowledgement in the literature on Heidegger. The seminar is of significant importance, however, and for a number of reasons. First, the one "ontological principle" on which it focuses, that is, the principle of noncontradiction, and whose supposed self-evidence is elsewhere described by Heidegger as “perhaps what is most puzzling in Western philosophy,” here receives its most extensive discussion by him. Second, in turning first to Kant’s insistence on the purely formal and logical character of the principle, Heidegger pursues a critique of Kant that both anticipates and supplements his later interpretations. Finally, the seminar turns to Aristotle with a detailed reading of *Metaphysics* γ that also, especially as concerns chapters three and following, is not to be found elsewhere in Heidegger. It is on this reading of Aristotle that I will focus here, while also reproducing the trajectory of the seminar as a whole. It will be shown that Heidegger’s reading defends the thesis that the principle of noncontradiction is neither a logical nor an ontological but an *existential* principle, that is, one that characterizes our existence in relation to beings. It will also be shown that Heidegger, while raising at the outset the question of the relation between the principle and a certain conception of time, a relation denied by Kant but presupposed by Aristotle, leaves it unanswered at the seminar’s end. Nevertheless, a certain answer can be inferred from what the seminar does say.

Claude Vishnu Spaak

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS IN THE WORKS OF HEIDEGGER AND PATOČKA**

This work confronts the Heideggerian and Patočkian interpretations of the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian Physics. Both interpretations share a point in common: according to Heidegger and Patočka, Aristotle conceives movement as a fundamental ontological determination of Being. Indeed, movement (κίνησις/μεταβολή) is conceived by Aristotle as a process of unconcealment, of coming into presence of entities in the openness of manifest being. Nevertheless, Heidegger and Patočka disagree on the way that one should understand the meaning of this ontological movement at the core of nature (φύσις). This work is dedicated to examining these differences. Our aim is to show, through Heidegger’s and Patočka’s interpretations of Aristotle, that there are two distinct and by all means opposed conceptions of the meaning and status of phenomenological ontology itself. We conclude both with Heidegger’s philosophical idealism (at least in his hermeneutical appropriation of Aristotle) and with Patočka’s contrary attempt to build a cosmological realism that challenges to a certain extent the identity between Being and meaning. In the working out of this thesis, a very particular focus is drawn on the concept that concentrates the entire charge of the tension, that is, the concept of matter (ἀν).
Jeff Love and Michael Meng

**HEIDEGGER’S SILENCE**

Martin Heidegger is not typically considered an esoteric writer as defined by Leo Strauss. Recent evidence, the hidden writings of the 1930s and the newly published *Black Notebooks*, suggest otherwise. This article argues that Heidegger is a profoundly esoteric writer whose esotericism reaches far beyond that of Strauss. Heidegger’s esotericism encompasses two fundamental aspects of his thinking, its efforts to define truth and the human relation to death. Heidegger strives in both cases to orient thinking to a “sigetics” or speaking of silence that shows what is most unsettling and dangerous about his thinking: its refusal to accept any account of origins and ends as authoritative.

Andrzej Serafin

**HEIDEGGER ON PLATO’S ORIGINARY GOOD: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION**

Heidegger’s phenomenology is rooted in Greek metaphysics. According to Heidegger’s claim, Aristotle was an earlier and more radical phenomenologist than Husserl, with ὄθωθος understood as Unverborgenheit constituting the core of Greek phenomenology. Already in one of his early remarks, Heidegger claims that ὄθωθος also underwent a process of deterioration and the original, phenomenological meaning of this concept was lost. Unfortunately, he never systematically developed the concept of originary ὄθωθος and based his narrative of Seinsvergessenheit on the loss and retrieval of the primordial concept of ὄθωθος. This essay is an attempt to analyze the process of deterioration and to reconstruct the originary concept of ὄθωθος upon the basis of remarks scattered around the entire corpus of Heidegger’s writings, in particular his interpretation of Plato. Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenological method with the three components of reduction, construction, and destruction are the guiding thread for this analysis.

Giorgio Agamben

**ARISTOTLE’S *DE ANIMA* AND THE DIVISION OF LIFE**

The concept of life is not used by Aristotle in the way we moderns use it, as something concerning biology or science, but rather it is initially a theological term, and subsequently it will become a philosophical tradition and perhaps also in the scientific tradition. Furthermore, there is the term “life,” for instance in the philosophical tradition and perhaps also in the scientific tradition, in which it is never defined. We never find a definition of what “life” means, what a ᾠσία is. But we find – on the contrary – an operation of division of life. Life is not defined but always divided, and this is from its origin up to now. Life is what cannot be defined and precisely for this reason must ceaselessly be articulated and divided. One should not underestimate the enormous importance of this Aristotelian strategy of division. It seems an innocuous philosophical operation, but if you now consider the development of Western science and medicine, you will see how this apparently innocuous operation constitutes a fundamental event that enables the construction of the entire edifice of modern medicine and science. Modern surgery was made possible only by material separation through anesthesia of vegetative life from consciousness (the ἔνστροφον from the other function). Medicine transformed this psychological and logical operation of division into a material operation. We are now able to separate vegetative life completely from mental life, thinking, sensation, and so forth. Out of the Aristotelian division of life into nutritive, sensational, thinking, conscious, there is one – ὄψικτον – that will act as the ἔνστροφον and allow for all modern sciences.

Antoni Szwed

**A LONG WAY TO JOHN LOCKE’S CONCEPT OF TOLERATION**

In *Letters Concerning Toleration* and in *Two Treatises of Government*, John Locke (1632-1704) elaborated the concept of toleration, which was of great importance for liberal democracy and generally for liberal culture in the world. Locke strongly contributed to the break in a long period of intolerance in English public life until the Glorious Revolution (1688-1689). The intellectual debate concerning the toleration concept, which paved the long way toward the Glorious Revolution, will be the subject of my analysis. I devote particular attention to Samuel Parker (1640-1688), the author of A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie, who argued for preserving the official religion and the official Church of England. Parker had two objectives. First, the official religion was to reinforce sovereign authority and to contribute to better observation of national law by its subjects. Second, Parker was silently arguing that the monarch’s religion is the true one.

Cordell D.K. Yee

**TRANSLATION AMONG THE LIBERAL ARTS: ON JOE SACHS’S ARISTOTLE**

This is a review of the work of Joe Sachs, an emeritus member of the faculty at St. John’s College (Annapolis, Maryland), who has published a septology of translations of Aristotle’s works: three theoretical works and four focused on human activities. The review
begins by making a case for translation as an important activity of liberal learning, not only as an application of the arts of the trivium, but also as an undertaking that aims at least in part to foster the examination of unexamined presuppositions. Sachs’s work offers plenty of examples to illustrate the former characterization, but that characterization is secondary to my main interest in the latter aim. I try to show how Sachs realizes this aim by considering some of his renderings of key terms and definitions, such as “motion,” “being,” and “soul.” With some of his renditions, Sachs attempts to make etymology visible, and the results, to say the least, are non-standard and non-traditional. As such, they help a reader to break through sedimentation accumulated from a consistency of scholarly practice in the translation of Aristotle—a consistency that obscures important aspects of his thinking, making it seem more static and abstract than it is.

Marek Ślawiński

HUSSELR, PLATO, AND THE HISTORICITY OF THE EIDÊ

The Philosophy of Husserl by Burt C. Hopkins is a book devised by its author to serve as an introduction to Husserl’s phenomenology for beginners. However, its unusual structure combined with high attention to detail and a broad spectrum of topics makes it a very original introduction, if introduction at all. The book begins with an emphasis on the importance of the last stage of Husserl’s phenomenology, that is, its turn to history. What immediately follows is the presentation of the “ancient precedent to pure phenomenology,” which Hopkins identifies as Plato’s and Aristotle’s dispute about the cĩõ. Everything closes with the refutation of the critique of Husserl’s phenomenology raised by Heidegger and Derrida. The presentation of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology is thus situated between Plato and Aristotle on the one hand and Heidegger and Derrida on the other. In this review I present the overall structure of the book, arguing that Hopkins’s considerations have two main purposes, one explicitly stated and the second implicitly realized. The former is to present and explain Husserl’s phenomenology project by reconstructing subsequent phases of its development, while the latter is to apply this thinking to investigate the origin of the ideal meaning of the cĩõ. Therefore, Hopkins’s book is not only about Husserl’s philosophy but is also a practical example of philosophizing done in this manner. I conclude this review by presenting and discussing Hopkins’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of the cĩõ. Despite the role of this fragment in the overall structure of this book, it can be treated as a stand-alone point of interest because of Hopkins’s employment of the notion of eidetic numbers in the interpretation of Plato’s thought.

Jakub Wolak

GEMMA PLATONICA: ON HEINRICH DÖRRIE’S PHILOLOGICAL PLATONISM

Heinrich Dörrie was a German philologist and a founder of Der Platonismus in der Antike (Platonism in Antiquity), a monumental eight-volume series, the first volume of which was published posthumously by his wife in 1987. The project was continued by his students and now, after over 30 years, is near completion. Platonism in Antiquity consists of 300 “building stones” (Bausteine) and aims at recollecting and reunifying the reportedly shattered tradition of ancient Platonism by making its textual witnesses available to the contemporary reader. Each building stone pertains to one topic of ancient Platonism and offers a review of crucial quotes from the sources alongside a German translation and commentary. Dörrie approaches the text in both an analytic and a synthetic way, presenting, exposing, and summarizing the preserved material, striving to provide an assimilative read—the assimilative read—to the user “rooted in the spiritual world of the twentieth century.” As such, Dörrie’s endeavor seems to be of much broader scope and aim than that of a simple archivist. The paper seeks to reconstruct Dörrie’s concept of Platonism and to present controversies it evoked in German-speaking Academia. Of particular interest are (1) the metaphor of Platonism as a crystal with many facets, (2) the accusation of identifying all of ancient Platonism with Middle Platonism, and (3) the hermeneutical principles that rely on a presupposition that there is a continuous yet fragmented Platonic tradition centered around an unwritten esoteric kernel. The paper gives a thorough summary of Dörrie’s thirty guiding sentences (Leitsätze), which sketch out the concept of Platonism as philosophy and religion in an aphoristic manner and concludes with a reflection on a Platonic understanding of philology.
The philosophical quarterly *Kronos* was established in 2007 by scholars connected with the University of Warsaw and the University of Białystok. Metaphysics, the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of literature and religion, history of psychoanalysis comprise the thematic scope of the journal. The editors of the quarterly strive to familiarize the Polish reader with new translations and commentaries of classic works (Plato, Joachim of Fiore, Nicholas of Cusa, Shakespeare, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, Heidegger, and many others), as well as the work of contemporary philosophers.

The annual *Kronos Philosophical Journal* (in English) was established in 2012 as a companion edition to the quarterly, to supplement it, yet without repeating the content of the Polish edition. The papers presented in the annual might be of interest to the readers from outside Poland, allowing them to familiarize themselves with the dynamic thought of contemporary Polish authors, as well as entirely new topics, rarely discussed by English-speaking authors. One of the issues published so far contained passages from previously unknown lectures by Leo Strauss on Aristotle; another issue was dedicated to the Russian phenomenologist Gustav Shpet.